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Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.: The
Settlement Credit Issue Answered for CERCLA
Litigation?
In Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held Akzo liable in
contribution to Aigner for costs incurred in a response action2 under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).3 The court found Akzo's liability to be
approximately 13% of Aigner's costs minus the amount Aigner
agreed to accept from third parties in settlement.4 Aigner incurred
the costs as the result of a consent decree it entered with the
Environmental Protection Agency. In the decree, Aigner and several
other responsible parties agreed to pay the costs associated with the
cleanup and remediation' of a hazardous waste site. Aigner and the
other responsible parties also entered into a private-party settlement
agreement addressing the distribution of costs of the response action.
Akzo was not a party to the settlement. Aigner then sued Akzo
for contribution, claiming Akzo was also a responsible party and
should bear a portion of the response costs.
6
The Seventh Circuit applied a dollar-for-dollar credit rule to
determine Akzo's contribution liability. This decision is important
because the cost associated with CERCLA response actions is high.7
The decision is also important because it is the first appellate opinion
addressing the issue of the appropriate settlement credit rule in a
private party's action for contribution against a non-settling
responsible party under the laws of CERCLA. The confusion
concerning how the non-settling party's liability should be
1. 197 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1999).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1995). The statute defines "response" to mean
"remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms
"removal" and "remedial action") include enforcement activities related thereto."
"Remove" or "removal" is defined as "the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment." The statute states that "remedy" or
"remedial action" means "those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken
instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance into the environment."
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995).
4. Akzo, 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1999).
5. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1995).
6. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 303-04.
7. It is estimated that the costs involved in CERCLA response actions average
$30 million per site. John M. Hyson, CERCLA Settlements, Contribution
Protection and Fairness to Non-Settling Responsible Parties, 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J.
277, 280 n.18 (1999) (citing House Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, Administration of the Federal
Superfund Program, H.R. Rep. No. 103-35, at 5 (1993)).
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determined exists because Congress enacted a provision under
CERCLA that expressly provides for the right of contribution in the
private party context, but that provision does not state how settlement
agreements should affect the contribution liability of non-settling
parties.' Most district courts have considered either the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act9 . or the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act'0 because each Act provides a method for calculating
contribution liability when there is a private party settlement. The
district courts, however, are split in their holdings."
The Seventh Circuit's decision does not end the confusion
because the court reversed the district court without adequately
explaining its reasoning. The decision is a good one from the
perspective ofjudicial economy and fairness, but the appellate court
decision provide's little certainty in the law. Unless the United States
Supreme Court decides to hear the issue, certainty will only be
provided if Congress adopts a clear provision addressing this issue.
This paper asserts that Congress should adopt the-ruling of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and explicitly declare
that the non-settling party should receive a credit for the amount of
the settlement. Furthermore, Congress should provide that the non-
settling parties must pay an equitable percentage of the orphan
shares, i.e., shares of the liability attributable to unknown or insolvent
parties. "
Part I of this paper describes the facts and holding of Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.3 Part II offers background
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1) (West 1995).
9. Unif. Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996).
10. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 185 (1996).
11. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 690 F. Supp.
1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988); and United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F. Supp.
1424 (W.D. Wash. 1990) have favored the proportionate share approach of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act. For an application of the dollar-for-dollar credit
rule of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, see Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Okla. 1993); Allied Corp.
v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp.,
720 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); and United
States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1989).
12. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir.
1999); William D. Auxer, Orphan Shares: Should They Be Borne Solely by Settling
PRP Conducting the Remedial Cleanup or Should They Be Allocated Among All
Viable PRPs Relative To Their Equitable Share of CERCLA Liability?, 16 Temp.
Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 267, 269 (1998) [hereinafter Auxer] ("Orphan shares are
response costs which are attributable to bankrupt or financially insolvent "PRP" or
are costs associated with a portion of hazardous waste not traceable to any known
or identifiable PRPs"). PRP is CERCLAjargon for "potentially responsible party."
13. 197 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1999).
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information on the law of CERCLA, the specific provisions
addressing contribution rights, the jurisprudence, and the issues that
remain unresolved after the Akzo decision. Part III describes the two
uniform tortfeasor acts most often considered when addressing the
problem of settlement credits and explains the split in the district
courts' decisions. Part IV analyzes the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Akzo. Specifically, this section explores the court's rejection of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, its use of the "federal law"
argument as support for its choice of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, the use of the Supreme Court's opinion in
the admiralty case of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, "4 and the court's
reading of Section 113 of CERCLA. Part V addresses the possible
effects of the Seventh Circuit's decision. Part VI offers a suggested
approach to solving the problem.
I. THE CASE: AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. AIGNER CORP.
From 1970 to 1986, Fisher-Calo Chemicals and Solvents
Corporation operated a facility where spent industrial solvents from
more than two hundred companies were distilled and the residues
from the distillation process were stored.' Both the EPA and the
Indiana State Board of Health investigated the site for numerous
violations associated with improper handling of hazardous waste, and
contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site were reported.' 6
In 1988, the EPA conducted an investigation and feasability study of
the site. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 105, the EPA designated the facility
a Superfund site in 1993."7 The EPA then issued an administrative
order to Fisher-Calo's past customers to engage in emergency
cleanup activities.'" The order covered Akzo and approximately
14. 511 U.S. 202,114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
15. AkzoNobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380,1381 (N.D.
Ind. 1992).'
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1381.
18. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir.
1994). Fisher-Calo had gone out of business before the facility was designated a
Superfund site, so pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607, the responsibility of cleanup fell
to the other parties, referred to in CERCLA jargon as "potentially responsible
parties." A potentially responsible party is a "covered person," defined in 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 1995) as a party that falls into one of the following classes:
(1) owner or operator of the facility; (2) any party who owned or operated the
facility at the time of disposal of the hazardous substance; (3) any person who by
contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by that person; and (4) any person who accepts
hazardous substance for the transport to disposal or treatment sites selected by that
person. This provision provides for strict liability of the "covered persons" since
fault is irrelevant. Fisher-Calo's customers fall into category 3.
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twenty other potentially responsible parties. This group agreed to
implement a cost sharing and allocation plan that included a
provision preventing the parties from later suing each other for the
project's cost.'9 Less than a year later, Akzo expressed the belief that
it was only liable for contamination at part of the site and withdrew
from the group.2" The remaining parties, including Aigner, entered
a consent decree with the EPA in 1991. The consent decree obligated
them to remediate the site at a cost of $40 million and to pay the EPA
$3.1 million for past cleanup expenses.2' Akzo was not a party to the
consent decree."
Aigner23 subsequently sought contribution from Akzo24 for
Akzo's portion of the cleanup costs that Aigner and the settling
parties had incurred at the site.25 The district court followed the
19. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380, 1381-82
(N.D. Ind. 1992). Akzo participated in part of the "emergency cleanup" spending
approximately $1.2 million. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that this work was not covered by the consent decree, and therefore
Akzo was allowed to pursue a contribution action against Aigner for these costs.
Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 1994).
20. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.
1994). Akzo later argued unsuccessfully for this position based on the theory that
each individual site comprised a separate "facility" under the terms of CERCLA,
and therefore its liability was divisible. The Seventh Circuit upheld the lower
courts ruling that all of the individual sites were one "facility." Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1999).
21. Later in the opinion, the court went on to recite amounts slightly different
than these, but these amounts are representative. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
22. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (N.D.
Ind. 1994)
23. Aigner represents itself and approximately 50 additional responsible parties
in this action.
24. As used in this paper and in the court's opinion, "Akzo" is shorthand for
"Akzo and O'Brien," the plaintiffs.
25. The original suit was filed by Akzo against Aigner seeking recovery of the
costs Akzo spent on the emergency cleanup and later planning activities. Aigner
responded by filing a counter-claim seeking contribution for Akzo's portion of the
response costs that it had incurred. Akzo argued to the court that it should not be
liable for a percentage of the total response costs because its solvents were sent to
only one site within the "facility." "Facility" as defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601
subpart (9)B (West 1995), means "any site or area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located."
Akzo argued that the district court was wrong to include all of the individual sites
in its definition of the "facility" and that each individual site should be a separate
"facility." The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. The appellate court also
rejected Akzo's claim that liability should be based on the toxicity of the solvents
sent by each party to the site, rather than the total volumes as the district court
determined. Akzo lost its action against Aigner for recovery of the emergency
costs, because both courts found Akzo to be a responsible party. The suit
proceeded on Aigner's claim for contribution. Akzo appealed the district court's
[Vol. 62250
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approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and held that
Aigner's recovery should be reduced by the percentage of fault of the
other potentially responsible parties. The court, however, read the
Act to require the exclusion of any potentially responsible parties not
party to the present suit. Therefore, to make up for any fault not
apportioned to either party the court held that Akzo should pay
approximately 13% of Aigner's total costs, even though Akzo was
only responsible for 9% of the total pollutants shipped to the site.26
Akzo appealed to the Seventh Circuit. It argued that the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act required the court to determine the liability of
all potentially responsible parties before determining the amount of
Akzo's contribution liability.27 The Seventh Circuit rejected both the
idea of determining the fault of all parties, as well as the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act's proportionate fault approach in general.28
The court based its rejection of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
approach on the language in Section 11 3(f)(1) that requires that the
contribution action "be governed by Federal law., 29 The court stated
that the Uniform Comparative Fault Act was not federal law and had
only been adopted by two states.30 Although no current "federal law"
covered the method for determining a non-settling defendant's
liability under a CERCLA contribution action, the court interpreted
the requirement of Section 113(f) to mean that it must at least apply
a nationally uniform law3 and stated that it was appropriate to
borrow a state rule when the only "alternative is judicial invention., 32
The Seventh Circuit then concluded that the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was the preferred method of
calculating Akzo's contribution liability.33 The court supported its
decision to determine proportionate share based on the number of gallons of solvent
Akzo sent to the site and the court's decision holding Akzo liable for a percentage
of the total cleanup cost. The Seventh Circuit found the district court's basis of
liability, total gallons of solvents sent to the site, to be an acceptable basis under the
statute's "equitable factors" language. Akzo had also argued that the harm was
divisible based on its view of what constituted the "facility" under the CERCLA
statute. The court rejected the idea of subdividing the site into multiple "facilities"
and held Akzo jointly and severally liable with the other potentially responsible
parties for the harm to the facility as a whole.
26. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ind.
1996).





31. Id. at 307.
32. Id. at 306.
33. Id. at 307.
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view by citing Section 113(0(2) of CERCLA.34  This provision
governs the contribution liability of responsible parties that do not
enter settlement agreements with the government. It requires that
contribution from non-settling parties be reduced by the dollar amount
of the settlement. 3' The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for determination of the actual value of settlements
entered into by Aigner and other responsible parties with the
instruction that Akzo should pay approximately 13% of the net of
Aigner's past and future collections.
II. THE LAW
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
Congress enacted CERCLA3 7 in 1980 "to provide for. liability,
compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous
substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites."'38 CERCLA accomplishes these goals
by forcing those responsible for the contamination to bear the burden
of remediation, an approach often referred to as an adoption of the
"polluter pays" theory. 9 Although CERCLA does not expressly
provide forjoint and several liability among tortfeasors in government
cleanup cases, thejurisprudence has consistently imposed such liability
among responsible parties for cleanup costs when the contamination
cannot be proven to be divisible."'
Until the "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986" (SARA),4' the statute also lacked an express provision granting
responsible parties who paid the response costs the right to seek
contribution from other responsible parties that did not participate in
34. Id.
35. Id. at 308.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995).
38. See SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1361
(D.N.J. 1996) (citing Pub. L. No. 96-510, 5 Stat. 2767 (1980)).
39. See generally Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
40. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259, 264 (3d
Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988); State
of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (extending and amending
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675).
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the remediation.42 The courts, however, have consistently held that
parties found liable under CERCLA did have the right to seek
contribution because that right furthered the goals of CERCLA.43
When it enacted SARA, Congress specifically endorsed the judicial
view' by expressly providing a provision that allows for a private
action for contribution against responsible parties.4 Several liability,
rather thanjoint and several liability, is applied under the contribution
provision.4 The SARA amendment also included a provision that
provides contribution protection for parties that settle with the
government.47 SARA expressly adopts the policy of encouraging
quick settlements with the government and attempts to accomplish this
goal by offering protection to those parties that choose to settle early.4
B. The Contribution Subsections
The SARA contribution provision, Section 113(f) of CERCLA,
contains three specific subsections. Sections 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(2)
authorize contribution actions and provide protection from
contribution suits for parties who settle with the government. Section
113(f)(3) explains that the government's right to complete relief is
superior to any settling party's contribution action.
42. Section 9607 did provide for cost recovery, but this provision has been
construed by the majority of courts to only apply to non-responsible parties that pay
for CERCLA cleanups. See Auxer, supra note 12 (discussing in depth the
difference between the two statutes and the case law interpreting them); Town of
New Windsor, 919 F. Supp. at 681; Steams & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin
Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 801 (D.N.J. 1996); and SC Holdings, Inc. v.
A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J. 1996). This paper will be
confined to discussion ofclaims by responsible parties, therefore, this cost recovery
provision will not be considered in the discussion of contribution claims
43. J. Whitney Pesnell, The Contribution Bar in CERCLA Settlements and Its
Effect on the Liability of Nonsettlors, 58 La. L. Rev. 167 (1997) [hereinafter
Pesnell] (citing Kristian E. Anderson, Note, TheRightto Contributionfor Response
Costs Under CERCLA, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 345 (1985)); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (common law right
to contribution action exists).
44. Pesnell, supra note 43, at 169.
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1) (West 1995).
46. New Jersey v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 821 F. Supp.
999, 1009 (D.N.J. 1993); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J.
1991); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1117
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2) (West 1995); Town of New Windsor v. Tesa
Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
48. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763,
775 (N.D. Okla. 1993); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 693(S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79,92 (1st Cir.
1990).
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Section 113(f)(1) 49 allows any person to seek contribution from
any other person who is liable as a responsible party50 under
CERCLA. The provision states that the claim for contribution shall
be governed by federal law.5 It provides the courts with broad
discretion to apply any "equitable factors" which it determines are
appropriate in resolving the specific contribution claim.52
Section 113(0(2)53 protects persons who enter into settlements
with states or the federal government to resolve their CERCLA
liability. The statute grants to those who settle protection against
contribution claims for matters that are addressed in the settlement
agreement.54 Other potentially responsible parties that do not enter
the settlement agreement are not released from liability unless the
agreement specifically provides for such a release. The settlement
does, however, have the effect of reducing the liability of those other
potentially responsible parties "by the amount of the settlement.,
55
Soon after these provisions were enacted, debate began
concerning their proper interpretation and application. In United
States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.,56 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that the language of Section
113(0(2) requires application of a dollar-for-dollar credit when
determining the contribution liability of a party that did not join a
settlement agreement between the government and other responsible
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613 (f)(1) (West 1995). The text of the statute reads:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by
Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate the
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of
this title.
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 1995).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1) (West 1995).
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2) (West 1995). The text of the statute reads:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.
Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable
persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of
the others by the amount of the settlement.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 899 F.2d 79, 91 (1st Cir. 1990).
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parties." Additionally, a district court in Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
American Airlines58 agreed that the pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar,
credit rule should be applied when the settlement involves the
government;, but that court also pointed out that the SARA
provisions do not specify which credit rule applies when the
settlement involves only private parties.59 Thus, it was unclear which
credit rule applies when the settlement involves only private parties.
I. Alternatives for Calculating the Settlement Credit
The two provisions added by SARA concerning contribution
claims have raised a considerable debate as to how the credit given
to the non-settling tortfeasor in a contribution action should be
calculated. The two approaches most often considered by courts are
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the Uniform Contribution
Fault Among Tortfeasors Act. Because use of these approaches can
produce greatly different results, the decision ofwhich method to use
may affect the litigation strategy of each party to the suit. The large
number of parties involved in most CERCLA actions, as well as the
complexity of the litigation in these suits, 60 creates a great need for
a predictable application.
A. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act Approach
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association approved the Revised
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1955. Eleven
states have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act,6' which provides for a contribution action when parties are
jointly or severally liable for the same harm.6 A party's recovery
may not exceed the amount it has paid in excess of its own share, nor
may the party from whom contribution is sought be forced to pay
more than its proportionate share of the total liability in
contribution. 63
57. Id. at 91.
58. 836 F. Supp. 763, 765 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
59. Id.
60. Often the number of potentially responsible parties may number in the
hundreds, or even thousands. See generally Martin A. McCrory, Who 's on First:
CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and Protection, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 3 (1999).
61. States adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act include:
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Tennessee.
62. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(a), 12 U.L.A. 194 (1996).
63. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 194 (1996).
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Section Four of the Act protects a settling party from contribution
claims related to matters addressed in the settlement and reduces the
claimant's recovery from the remaining responsible parties by the
"anount stipulated by the release or covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater."" In effect, the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act establishes a "pro
tanto" or "dollar-for-dollar" method of recovery.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act imposes two
conditions on settling parties. A settlement that releases a
responsible party from further liability must be reasonable, and the
parties must enter the settlement in "good faith."65 Some courts have
interpreted this requirement to mean that a good faith hearing is
required.66 Disagreement as to the extent of the hearing needed also
exists among those courts that find that a hearing is required.67
The most important aspect of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act is that the Act guarantees full compensation to
parties who settle and seek contribution for remediation of a'
contaminated site. The Act accomplishes this by providing that non-
settling parties remain liable for all remaining costs not recovered in
the settlement. Thus, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act encourages claimants to settle by insuring that they will receive
full compensation for their loss. This method prevents a party
seeking contribution from receiving a windfall by limiting the total
recovery to the amount of the loss
Responsible party defendants are also motivated to settle because
of the risk of disproportionate liability if the claimant settles with
other parties for less than their shares of the costs. The Act may,
however, create an incentive to postpone settlement in certain cases
in the hopes that the claimant will settle with other parties for more
than their proportionate shares, thus reducing the non-settling party's
amount of liability. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act approach has been described as "both a sword and a shield"
because it protects the settlers from future liability while straddling
non-settlers with the difference or "orphan shares.'"68
The Act uses a "pro rata," or "by heads," method of determining each party's share
of the harm. Section I 13(f)(1) of CERCLA provides that a court may consider
"equitable factors" in deciding each party's share of the harm. Therefore, the "pro
rata" provision of the Act is not applicable under CERCLA.
64. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act §§ 4(a), 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 264(1996).
65. Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996).
66. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467(1994).
67. See Pesnell, supra note 43, at 240.
68. Steven Ferry, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: A
Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 36, 73
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An example may clarify how the statute works. Assume the
response costs for a site are forty million dollars and parties A, B, and
C are responsible parties. The percentage of fault of each party is
later found to be 50%, 30%, and 20% respectively. Party A pays the
total cost of $40 million and then enters into a settlement agreement
with Party B for fifteen million dollars, or 37.5% of the cost. Party
A then may seek contribution from Party C for C's portion of the
response costs. Under the dollar-for-dollar credit theory of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Party C would pay
five million dollars in contribution, because the forty million dollar
cost is reduced by the fifteen million dollar settlement, and Party C
is only liable for 20% of the remaining total. Therefore, Party C will
pay only 12.5% of the total cost.
B. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977 (the "Comparative
Fault Act") was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and sets forth a proportionate
share approach that Iowa and Washington have adopted legislatively.
The Act provides that the court will determine the "equitable share"
of each party according to the percentage of fault assigned to each
party, including those parties released under Section Six of the Act,
after trial on the matter.69 Section Six provides that a "covenant not
to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person
liable" has the effect of releasing the liable party and protecting it
from future claims for contribution. This approach also reduces the
claimant's future recovery by the "amount of the released person's
equitable share."70 In addition, Section Four of the Act establishes a
right of contribution between two or more parties who are jointly and
severally liable, whether or not judgment has been rendered against
them.7
The key difference between the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and the Comparative Fault Act is that under the
Comparative Fault Act each party remains liable for their percentage
-of harm based on the total costs, regardless of whether a settlement
has reduced the actual cost to the party seeking contribution.
Furthermore, under the Comparative Fault Act the percentage of fault
attributed to the responsible parties is not determined until trial on the
matter. Because responsible parties who settle prior to trial cannot
know how much fault will be attributed to them, the parties will be
(1994).
69. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135 (1996).
70. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (1996).
71. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 142 (1996).
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burdened with the risk of complete recovery. Thus, the claimant
may underestimate the party's share and be prevented from
recovering completely, or it may overestimate the party's share and
receive a windfall. Only rarely will the claimant recover its exact
costs because of the uncertainty of each party's share of fault before
trial. The strength of this approach is that it promotes equitable
allocation of liability among all of the responsible parties; its
weakness is the lack of a provision to allow a claimant to recover
"orphan shares," thus placing the risk upon the claimant.
Returning to the previous example involving Parties A, B, and
C, the Comparative Fault Act approach Would result in Party C
being liable for contribution to Party A for eight million dollars.
This occurs because each party remains liable for their percentage
of harm based on the total costs, regardless of any settlements that
reduce the actual cost to the party seeking contribution.
C. The Jurisprudence
Many district courts have faced the issue of which partial
settlement credit rule should be used in private party CERCLA
litigation when a non-settling defendant is faced with an action for
contribution. Prior to the enactment of the SARA contribution
provisions the district court in United States v. Conservation
Chemical" expressed its view that the proportionate share approach
outlined in the Comparative Fault Act was most consistent with the
goals of CERCLA. Interestingly, even after the passage of the
SARA amendments most courts73 continued to follow the
Comparative Fault Act as set forth in Conservation Chemical. In
Atlantic Richfield Company v. American Airlines, Inc.,74 the district
court set forth both the majority and minority view on the issue. As
the Atlantic Richfield opinion explained, most courts found the
settlement provision of SARA, which allowed for the pro tanto
approach of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
applied only to settlements with the government. Those courts
continued to view the proportionate share approach of the
Comparative Fault Act as more consistent with the underlying
principles of CERCLA legislation.75
72. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
73. Id. (citing Edward Himes Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.
Supp. 651 (N. D. Ill. 1987); Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, 690
F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988); and United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 1424 (W.D. Wash. 1990) as support).
74. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763, 765(N.D. Okla. 1993).
75. Atlantic Richfield Co., 836 F. Supp. at 765.
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The Atlantic Richfield court then proceeded to recognize that a
minority of district courts have taken the approach that Congress'
intent in passing SARA was to reject the Comparative Fault Act
approach. 6 Those courts have found that the pro tanto rule is the
appropriate method for determining the credit due a non-settling
defendant. In holding that the pro tanto rule should be followed in
the Atlantic Richfield case, the district court concluded, "the selection
of the proper credit rule is a matter that has been left to the [c]ourt's
discretion, to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis."77
Although many district courts have considered the partial
settlement credit rule issue, it remains unresolved. The district courts
are split as to which approach should be adopted, and the issue had
not been addressed by an appellate court until the Akzo decision.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AKZO DECISION
The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's view that the
Comparative Fault Act should be applied in determining a non-
settling party's liability in a contribution action under CERCLA. The
appellate court reasoned that the Comparative Fault Act had the
potential of causing disproportionate liability and that the means of
preventing such an outcome was costly and time consuming. To
support its view that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act was preferable, the Seventh Circuit relied on the language of
Sections 113(0(1) and 113(0(2) of CERCLA, and the admiralty case
of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde. Although the court came to an
equitable and workable solution, it failed to explain the reasoning
behind its holding. Therefore, the question of which method should
be used in calculating a CERCLA non-settling defendant's
contribution liability remains an open one.
A. Rejection of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
The appellate court provided an inadequate explanation for its
decision to reject the Uniform Comparative Fault Act as the
appropriate approach for determining the credit due to Akzo. The
Seventh Circuit began the discussion by recognizing and rejecting the
76. Id. at 766 (citing Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990);
United States v. Cannons Eng'g. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027 (D.C. Mass. 1989),
aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); and United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F.
Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1989)).
77. Atlantic Richfield Co., 836 F. Supp. at 766.
78. 511U.S. 202, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
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district court's misapplication of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
in which it only considered the present parties to the suit. The court
found that this approach might allow a responsible party to "turn a
tidy profit" by agreeing to remediate a site and then carefully
planning its litigation strategy to recover more than the other parties'
equitable shares of the costs.79 As clarification for this view, the
court offered two hypotheticals.
In the first hypothetical, firms A, B, and C are responsible for
sending 40%, 10% and 50% of the pollutants to a site, respectively.
If A agreed to remediate the site and then sued only B for
contribution, B would pay 20% of the total costs according to the
district court's reading of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act produces this result because B's
10% of the total amount of pollutants sent is 20% of the pollutants A
and B generated jointly. If C has already settled and paid his 50%
share of responsibility, A will have reduced his contribution to the
total costs to 30%, from its original 40%, by choosing to settle with
C and file suit against B.8°
In its second hypothetical, the court considered a situation in
which ten firms are equally responsible for contamination of a site.
If A once again agreed to perform the remediation and then sued B,
A would recover 50% of the costs from B, because they are equally
responsible for the waste. A could then proceed to sue C and recover
another 50% of the costs. This process could continue with A
ultimately recovering 450% of the total cleanup costs from the other
responsible parties, thus making an outstanding profit. The court also
noted that even if a cap of 100% of costs was set to prevent A from
turning a profit, the possible result could still be unfair. B and C
could each be held to pay 50% of the costs each, while the remaining
firms could be left to pay nothing.81 The appellate court said of this
possibility, "[It] is not a sensible outcome of a process that is
supposed to yield an 'equitable' allocation of expenses."82
Applying this reasoning to the suit involving Akzo, the appellate
court decided that following the district court's approach might have
allowed Aigner to receive a windfall because Akzo's liability was
increased to cover a percentage of the total cost greater than the
actual liability credited to Akzo. The lower court based liability on
total gallons of solvents sent to the site by each party. The district
court found that Akzo and Aigner shipped approximately 9% and
71%, of the solvents by volume, respectively, but Akzo was ordered





to pay almost 13% of Aigner's total costs."3 The history of the case
does not provide information as to whether all responsible parties
were located and solvent, but Aigner did have claims pending against
other non-settling responsible parties." If one or more of the
responsible parties were missing or unable to pay its portion of the
damage, Aigner might have been left to bear the "orphan shares." If
all the parties were accounted for, Aigner may have recovered twice
for the portion of harm that the district court increased Akzo's share
to cover.
One way to prevent such injustice would be to require that all
responsibility be apportioned before any party is required to pay.
This argument is the heart of Akzo's plea to the court to apportion the
fault of all parties before entering judgment regarding Akzo's
liability. The court rejected this approach, stating that it would either
"complicate an already difficult allocation process or straddle firms
such as Aigner with excess costs."85 The only reasoning for this
decision is judicial economy in suits involving numerous parties. In
such a case, the determination of fault could be a very lengthy and
expensive process for the court, since it is difficult to determine the
"responsibility for wastes sent years (if not decades) ago to a firm
that did not keep good records and contaminated a wide area."8
The possibility also exists that Akzo could have been required to
join all of the responsible parties so as to prevent it from bearing all
of the orphan shares and also to prevent Aigner from receiving a
windfall. This requirement shifts the burden of locating all of the
parties onto Akzo rather than Aigner. This burden is an unfair one
because the number of potential parties is usually very numerous.8 7
The added time and costs involved could have the effect of forcing
parties to enter settlement agreements that they feel are unfair just to
minimize their losses.
The appellate court also briefly considered the argument that both
Akzo and Aigner were wrong concerning the appropriate reading of
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, but then quickly dismissed the
idea of considering the approach any further. By raising the question
of whether the Uniform Comparative Fault Act might be read to
include either pollution shares of other parties or actual recoveries
83. Id. at 304. The appellate court states that the 13% was derived by dividing
the Akzo's volume of solvents shipped by the total gallons. However, there is a
mathematical discrepancy because nine divided by eighty does not equal thirteen.
The opinion does not provide enough information to accurately determine how the
value was calculated.
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. at 306.
86. Id. at 308.
87. McCrory, supra note 60.
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from other parties"8 and then failing to provide a definitive answer,
the court opened its rejection of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
approach to attack. The "pollution shares" approach appears to be
workable in this case because the language of SARA allows liability
to be based on "equitable factors" 9 other than fault. In the case of
Akzo, the court does not explain why it would be difficult to
determine the volumes of solvents shipped to the site by all
responsible parties.
Later in the opinion, the court returned to its ten-firm hypothetical
to demonstrate that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
is a preferable solution. Recall that each of the firms is equally
responsible for the contamination. The court considered the situation
where A remediates the site and then settles with both C and D for
their share of the costs, or a total of 20% of the cost. If A then
proceeds to sue B, under the proportionate fault approach of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, B would be liable for 40% of the
total costs, regardless of the amount of the actual recovery by A, if all
other parties were excluded from consideration. This result is
reached because B must pay half of the remaining 80% of the original
cost.
The court then considered the outcome produced by the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Under the pro tanto approach,
or dollar-for-dollar credit, A's recovery would be reduced by the
actual amount of collections, and A and D would share the remaining
costs equally.90 The court stated that "[e]xcluding only actual
collections from third parties enables the court to conserve its
resources."'" By limiting recovery to the actual costs of the response
action, this method also prevents the claimant from receiving a
windfall.
B. Reliance on Section 113for Support of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
The Seventh Circuit looked to the language of the statute itself to
support its view that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act is the appropriate approach for determining the effect of a
settlement on the non-settling party in an action for contribution. The
court stated, "[t]o the extent language in section 113 speaks to the
issue, it prefers the approach" of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act.92 The court based this broad statement on Section
88. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 306.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1) (West 1995).
90. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307.
91. Id. at 308.
92. Id. at 307.
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113(f)(2) which addresses the situation when various responsible
parties settle with the government.93 The court later referred to this
provision as the "most closely related rule of law."94 The language
of that provision--"but it reduces the potential liability of the others
by the amount of the settlement"-has itself been the issue of much
litigation.95 The court agreed with the majority view and read this
language to mean that Congress expressly provided that the pro tanto
approach should be used in situations involving government
settlements.96
Although looking to legislation as a whole to determine the
meaning of an unclear provision is a standard method of
interpretation, the possibility exists that Congress intended two
different interpretations in the CERCLA context. Congress may, in
fact, have intended the pro tanto approach to apply when the
government is a party and a different approach to apply in cases when
it is not. However, the intent of Congress is unclear because the
provision does not have language regarding private party settlements.
Many incentives exist to allow the pro tanto approach to apply to
the government. One is to allow for complete recovery. The
government may pay to remediate a site for which it was not
originally responsible. The pro tanto approach guarantees that if the
government enters into a settlement, it will immediately know the
effect that settlement will have on its total recovery. This approach
allows the government to avoid the extensive costs of litigation by
leaving it free to accept such settlements without fear that it will be
left to pay any "orphan shares."
The incentive to protect what has been referred to as the "liable
plaintiff'97 is much weaker. The basis of this argument is that when
a party holds some responsibility for the harm, it is fair to saddle that
party with any potential shortfalls in recovery due to pre-litigation
settlements. This theory can be reconciled with the "polluter pays"
policy of CERCLA because the plaintiff seeking relief is in fact a
"polluter." Therefore, the pro tanto approach may unfairly burden
the non-settling party, also a responsible party, with the shortfall
resulting from settlements the claimant accepted. This approach
seems to be even more unfair when the claimant is more responsible
than the non-settling party. In that case, the need to protect the
claimant's right to total recovery may be outweighed by the goal of
requiring each party to pay in proportion to their "equitable share."
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2) (West 1995).
94. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308.
95. See generally Pesnell, supra note 43.
96. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307.
97. See Marc L. Frohman, Rethinking the Partial Settlement Credit Rule in
Private Party CERCLA Actions: An Argument in Support of the Pro Tanto Rule, 66
U. Colo. L. Rev. 711 (1995).
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Adopting a different rule for private party contribution actions
would not negatively affect CERCLA's goal of encouraging quick
cleanups. As in the Akzo case, these claims arise after the
remediation has begun, or even after it has been completed by one or
more of the other potentially responsible parties. Therefore, speed of
settlement is not as strong a goal as it is in governmental settlements.
An argument could be made that the responsible parties would not
have reached a speedy settlement with the government if they had
believed that they would not be capable of recovering some of their
expenses through contribution. In reality, responsible parties often
do not have much of a choice regarding their actual cleanup
activities. Because of the power granted to the government by
CERCLA, these parties often are encouraged to enter into a consent
decree by the threat of litigation with the government in which they
have little chance of winning.9" Therefore, the more economical
choice is to settle.
. The Seventh Circuit read the CERCLA provisions to suggest that
the same credit rule should apply regardless of the identity of the
parties to the suit. For the reasons set forth above, this view is not a
necessary one; however, the view may be a sensible one because of
its simplicity. Adopting a different view, the proportionate share
approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, when private party
settlements are at issue, does not undermine the overall goals of the
CERCLA legislation. The argument that the statute requires
application of the pro tanto rule is not enough to support the court's
view that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act must
apply to contribution actions among private party litigants; however,
it does add support to the court's opinion when read as a whole.
C. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde
At least one commentator has argued that CERCLA's legislative
history supports the view that common law principles should be used
in the absence of express litigation on an issue."' The courts have
taken this approach by importing the doctrine of divisibility of harm
and equitable apportionment into the CERCLA jurisprudence.' 0°
Unfortunately, this case presents an issue of first impression at the
appellate court level, and the Seventh Circuit cannot depend on a
98. Once a party has been identified as a potentially responsible party, it is held
strictly liable for the remediation costs. The defenses allowed under CERCLA
make it almost impossible to avoid such responsibility.
99. See Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age ofSuperfund: A




well-developed body of case-law to answer the question presented.
Nevertheless, the court did consider the Supreme Court decision of
McDermott, Inc. v. Am Clyde,"' a case that involved a similar issue
of contribution raised in the admiralty context. Although not binding
on the Seventh Circuit's decision because it concerned a different
body of law, the Supreme Court, in its McDermott opinion, provided
an analytical approach to the choice between the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act and Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act that could be easily applied by analogy to the issue under the
laws of CERCLA. The Seventh Circuit, however, mischaracterized
the Court's efforts by stating that McDermott stood for the
proposition that the choice was merely a "tossup."' 2 Moreover, it
failed to apply the Supreme Court's reasoning to the Akzo case in
order to arrive at a logical and well supported result.
The Supreme Court held that the contribution liability of a non-
settling party in an admiralty case should be calculated using the
proportionate fault approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
rather than the dollar-for-dollar credit rule of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act."0 3
McDermott, Inc. " involved an action in admiralty for damages
to a crane and offshore platform. AmClyde sold McDermott a
specially designed 5,000 ton crane for use in its off-shore operations.
McDermott first used the crane in an attempt to lift an oil platform
deck from a barge to its base in the Gulf of Mexico. During that
transfer, one of the main hooks on the sling broke, causing damage
to the crane and the deck. McDermott filed an action against
AmClyde, River Don (the hook manufacturer), and the other three
companies that supplied parts for the sling that collapsed. 5
Prior to trial, McDermott entered into a settlement agreement
with the three "sling defendants." The agreement stated that in
exchange for $1 million McDermott would release the parties from
the suit and indemnify them against future action for contribution by
AmClyde or River Don.' 6
After a trial on the merits, the trial court determined the damages
to be $2.1 million. Based on answers to special interrogatories, the
court allocated liability to the parties in the amounts of: 30% to
McDermott and the three settling defendants, 32% to AmClyde and
38% to River Don. The court entered judgment against AmClyde
101. 511 U.S. 202, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
102. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir.
1999).
103. Id. at 217, 114 S. Ct. at 1470.
104. McDermott, Inc., 511 U.S. 202, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
105. Id. at 205, 114 S. Ct. at 1463.
106. Id. at 205, 114 S. Ct. at 1464.
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and River Don in the amount of $672,000 and $798,000
respectively.'0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the judgement of the district court, holding that a contract provision
between McDermott and AmClyde prevented any recovery against
the crane manufacturer. In addition, the court concluded that the
district court improperly allocated final damage awards among the
parties, holding that a pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar, credit rule
should have been applied. Thus reducing McDermott's possible
recovery by the $1 million received in settlement and the 30%
liability attributed to the plaintiff and settling defendants together, or
$1,630,000, with AmClyde and River Don liable for the remaining
$470,000 according to their percentage of fault.'0 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the issue of
first impression concerning the effect of partial settlement on non-
settling defendants in an admiralty action for contribution.'0 9 The
Court noted the lack of legislation as well as the apparent lack of a
consensus among the circuit courts in similar cases. The Court then
offered a brief overview of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
The Court stated that three goals must be considered when
determining which of the approaches is the most favorable. Those
considerations are: (1) consistency with the Court's earlier holding
that the proportionate fault approach of calculating damages applies
in maritime cases;"0 (2) promotion of settlement; and (3) judicial
economy." 1
The Court found that the pro tanto rule would lead to a result
contrary to its earlier holding that damages should be apportioned
based on fault. In drawing this conclusion, the Court noted that the
proportionate share rule was consistent with the Court's earlier
holding because, under most circumstances, the litigating defendant
is only required to pay its share. The pro tanto rule is contrary to the
goal of proportionality because it is rare that a settling defendant will
ever pay exactly its proportionate share of the loss.
Because decisions to settle most often reflect the uncertainty of
trial and the plaintiffs need for a "war chest" to finance future
107. Id. at 206, 114 S. Ct. at 1464.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 207, 114 S. Ct. at 1464.
110. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708
(1975). The Court replaced an equal damage rule with a rule requiring that
damages be apportioned based on the proportionate share of fault when such an
allocation can be reasonably made in a maritime case. The Court held that the
simplicity of the old rule must yield to the fairness promoted by the new rule.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1465 (1994).
111. McDermott, Inc., 511 U.S. at 211, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
litigation, the plaintiff will frequently settle for an amount less than
the proportionate share of the settling defendants. Settling for less
than a party's share leaves the non-settling defendants open to
increased judgments. The Court noted that "good faith" hearings are
often required to reduce the potential for unfairness, but concluded
that these hearings did not effectively protect the non-settling
defendants because to do so they would have to be "mini-trials" on
the merits. Therefore, the pro tanto approach, even with the
requirement of a good faith hearing, ran counter to the Supreme
Court's earlier holding that damages in admiralty cases must be
calculated based on proportionate fault." 2
The Court had a more difficult time in determining which rule
encourages settlements. The pro tanto rule encourages settlements by
allowing the plaintiff to know in advance how much recovery he will
receive, and it may entice defendants to settle in the hopes of paying
less than they would be ordered to at trial. Because this method
leaves the non-settling defendants at a disadvantage by requiring
them to remain jointly and severally liable for the remainder of the
loss, the method may be viewed as encouraging complete, rather than
partial settlements. The Court found that this increased incentive to
settle came "at too high a price" to non-settling defendants. The
Court reasoned that other factors such as avoidance of litigation
costs, interest in certainty of final payments, and the desire to
maintain ongoing commercial relationships was enough to encourage
pre-trial settlements in most cases. Because the Court could not see
any reasonable advantage to the pro tanto rule in encouraging
settlements, it held that the proportionate share rule was adequate to
promote this goal." 3
Finally, the Court considered the effect on judicial economy of
the two approaches. It stated that the pro tanto rule was obviously
more advantageous to the goal ofjudicial economy. Because the risk
of unfairness is high, however, the Court refused to consider applying
the pro tanto rule without the requirement of the "good faith" hearing.
The additional time which is necessary to comply with this
requirement makes it impossible to determine which method is more
favorable. The only difference between the approaches is when the
determination of fault of the parties would be made. In the pro tanto
approach the determination would be made in a pre-trial hearing,
whereas in the proportionate share approach it would be made at trial.
Although most "good faith" hearings are merely "cursory," the Court
acknowledged the possibility that in reserving the apportionment of
liability for trial the proportionate share approach may, in certain
112. Id. at 212, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
113. Id. at 214-16, 114 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
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circumstances, be more efficient. In particular, the Court noted that:
(1) the defendants may settle prior to the actual trial rendering the
determination unnecessary; (2) because the same facts needed to
determine fault may be introduced at the trial anyway, it may not
actually require additional court time; and (3) the possibility that the
non-settling defendant will escape liability by using the "empty
chair" defense supports use of the rule. Therefore, the Court could
not make a definitive determination of which method better promotes
judicial economy."'
In applying the McDermott case to the Akzo case, the Seventh
Circuit did an injustice to the careful reasoning provided by the
Supreme Court. The appellate court did not address the fact that the
goals of admiralty law and CERCLA are very similar, nor did it
engage in the same careful weighing of each approach before
incorrectly stating that McDermott found the choice between the two
methods a simple "tossup."" 5 The appellate court then used this
description of McDermott's careful weighing to support its view that
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act approach was
preferable by distinguishing the prior case as one of admiralty.
The proportionate fault method of calculating damages, used by
the Supreme Court in admiralty cases, is consistent with the "polluter
pays" theory of CERCLA. Section 113(0(1) allows courts to use
"equitable factors" in allocating response costs among responsible
parties. Therefore, using the reasoning of McDermott, the
proportionate share approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
also appears to be preferable to further this goal under the laws of
CERCLA. Actually determining the proportionate share of parties
involved in CERCLA litigation may be difficult or even impossible.
The complexity of determining responsibility for hazardous waste
contamination is usually frustrated by the lack of records or other
means of reliably determining events that may have occurred many
years prior to the litigation.
The "equitable factor" language recognizes that there is not a
standard formula for determining responsibility. In Akzo's case, the
courts chose to base liability on volumes of solvents shipped to the
facility. Therefore, it would appear that the court could determine the
proportionate share of all parties prior to determining liability.
However, in many cases this task may not be as easy to accomplish
and could add years of trial time to an already lengthy litigation
experience. Furthermore, the goals of encouraging settlements and
increasing judicial economy weigh more heavily on the decision in
114. Id. at 216, 114 S. Ct. at 1469.
115. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir.
1999).
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the CERCLA context. Because CERCLA litigation can involve
parties numbering in the hundreds or even thousands," 6 judicial
economy must be given serious consideration. The Seventh Circuit
briefly pointed out the potential for complex and protracted litigation
in the CERCLA context, but it failed to explain the actual weight of
this argument.
The pro tanto credit rule favors judicial economy since the court
may simply deduct the amount of the settlement agreement from the
claimant's recovery before allocating the liability of any non-settling
defendants. The proportionate fault approach does not conserve the
resources of the court as effectively because the fault of each party
must be determined prior to determining liability. The trial court
attempted to ease this burden by stating that the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act only required the court to consider the fault
of the parties to the suit. The Seventh Circuit rejected this view
because excluding non-parties may unfairly burden the non-settling
party with disproportionate liability." 7  The McDermott factors
support the choice of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act's pro tanto approach in the complex CERCLA suit context.
D. The "Federal Law" Argument as Support for Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
The court rejected the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, reasoning
that the statute requires that the action be based on federal law. No
federal legislation exists that directly determines the issue. The court
justified its choice of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, which is also not a federal rule, by expressing the principle of
interpretation that it may borrow from state law when its only
alternative is "judicial invention."' 8  The court' interpreted the
"federal law" requirement to mean that the law it adopts should be
"nationally uniform."' 9 It then rejected the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act because it had only been adopted in two states, while
recognizing that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeaosrs Act
had only been adopted in eleven states.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also contains a provision
addressing contribution.' Because its provision was added
following the adoption of both the Uniform Acts, it is a source to
116. McCrory, supra note 60; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp.,
720 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
117. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 306.
118. Id. at 306-07.
119. Id.at307.
120. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A (1979).
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consult for an answer to the question of which settlement credit rule
to apply in a contribution action. In 1979, the Restatement included,
for the first time, a provision to address the issue of contribution
among tortfeasors.' Section 886A provides for a right of
contribution among joint tortfeasors similar to the one CERCLA
provides in Section 113(f)(1), but it fails to provide for the method of
apportionment of the "equitable shares" of the tortfeasors. In the
comments to the Restatement, the American Law Institute makes it
clear that both the pro tanto and proportionate share approaches were
considered, and that each has positive and negative attributes.' By
failing to adopt one of the methods in particular, the Institute makes
it clear that no nationally recognizable preference in approach
currently exists.
In making the "federal law" argument, the Seventh Circuit did not
clarify its reasoning. The court was faced with legislation that
demanded the contribution action be governed by federal law when
none currently exists. In spite of this the court was forced to
determine which rule should be considered the federally adopted one,
and it chose the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act The
court explained that Section 113(0(2), governing settlements with the
government, requires the application of the pro tanto approach and
that adopting the Uniform Comparative Fault Act for contribution
actions among private parties "would undermine that decision." '
The court's "federal law" argument would have been more
persuasive if the court had clearly articulated that it was choosing one
of the approaches to be the "federal law," rather than rejecting the
other approach because it was not a "federal law."
V. EFFECT OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
In remanding the case to the lower court, the Seventh Circuit
ordered that Akzo should be held liable for only "12.56% of the costs
net" of Aigner's past and future collections."' This order was an
application of the pro tanto rule to reduce Akzo's liability by the
actual dollar amount of Aigner's collections. Although the court
urged the application of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act approach, it modified this approach by including a
reduction for actual recoveries.
The Seventh Circuit obviously placed great emphasis on the
guarantee of complete recovery for the claimant when it chose to
utilize the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. However,
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307.
124. Id. at 308.
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it also set up a method for preventing Aigner from unfairly
benefitting by carefully planning its litigation strategy. The method
chosen by the court was to append the requirement that Aigner's
actual collections and any future recoveries would be effectively
credited towards Akzo's liability. 1
25
Although the Seventh Circuit did not specifically address the
percentage of liability for which it held Akzo liable, the effect of the
holding protects both claimants and non-settling parties from being
straddled with all of the orphan shares.'26 The appellate court briefly
explained that the district court increased Akzo's liability from the
9% by volume of solvents it sent to the site to 13% of the total
liability. The Seventh Circuit later adopted the 13% in its holding,
but it is unclear whether it was intentional. The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act requires the non-settling party to pay only its
proportionate share of the liability, thus causing the claimant to be
left with any costs that cannot be recovered from a responsible party.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act reduces the
claimants recovery by the amount of actual collections, but it then
leaves the parties to the suit each liable for an equal share of the
orphan shares. In Akzo's case, this result would be unfair because
Akzo was found only to have shipped 9% of all solvents to the site,
whereas Aigner's share of the response costs was a much greater
71%. The effect of the Seventh Circuit's decision is to split the
orphan shares proportionately among the parties to the suit. This
result is fair because neither party is forced to bear all of the orphan
shares, and the shares are fairly distributed.
The drawback to this approach is that it may discourage Aigner
from pursuing any future claims because its recovery from Akzo
would be reduced if it were successful. Also, if Aigner did proceed
with litigation in the future, Akzo's liability could remain an issue
indefinitely.
The court suggested at the end of the opinion that its choice of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which places the risk
of shortfall on Akzo, is not unfair to Akzo. If Akzo believed the
settlements were too low, it either could have intervened or
challenged the good faith of the settlements. 27 However, these
options place additional financial burdens on Akzo should it choose
125. Id.
126. See Auxer, supra note 12 (arguing that allocating orphan shares among all
responsible parties in proportion to their equitable share of liability will encourage
settlements with the government since claimants will be able to recover these costs
through contribution); see also Frohman, supra note 97 (raising the liable plaintiff
argument to support the view that the non-settling party should not bear all of the
risk of orphan shares).
127. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308.
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to utilize them, and, in reality, they are very unlikely to protect
Akzo's interests because a court will rarely disrupt a settlement upon
the complaint of a third party. 2 ' In order to do so, the court would
be required to hold an extensive hearing to fully determine the effect
the settlement would have on Akzo. It is unlikely that a court will
hold such a hearing, and doing so would undermine this court's
emphasis on judicial economy.
The problem with the court's opinion is its failure to address
fully the reasoning that led to its decision. This decision, addressing
an issue of first impression at the appellate court level, will be
carefully scrutinized by future courts faced with the same issue.
Future courts are unlikely to find strong justification for following
the Seventh Circuit's holding. Therefore, this holding will have the
effect of strengthening the argument that Congress actually left this
decision to the court's discretion to be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
VI. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Congress should legislatively adopt the Seventh Circuit's
approach for calculating the liability of non-settling responsible
parties in CERCLA claims for contribution. By doing so, Congress
will provide a fair, easily applicable solution. Adopting express
legislation will also provide certainty in the law so that future parties
may accurately weigh the potential effects of either choosing to settle
or proceeding with litigation. Congress should add language to the
existing contribution provision that requires a dollar-for-dollar credit
for recovery due to settlement or future litigation and also authorizes
the courts to divide the remaining costs on a proportionate share basis
to guarantee that the entire risk of any orphan shares are not placed
on any single party. The added language should read: "A claimant's
recovery shall be reduced by the amount recovered in settlement or
future litigation, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and the non-settling
party's liability shall be based on its proportionate share of the
remaining claim." The addition of this clearly worded language to
the existing contribution provision expressly providing for the
method of calculation of a non-settling party's settlement credit
should end the judicial debate of which settlement credit rule should
be applied in CERCLA contribution suits.2 9
128. See Lynette Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund
Settlement Dilemma, 27 Land & Water L. Rev. 83 (1992).
129. Revised § 113(0(1) should read in full:
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In resolving contribution claims, the
court may allocate response costs among the liable parties using such
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Until Congress chooses to adopt legislation that explicitly
resolves the question of which settlement credit rule should apply in
the CERCLA context, courts will have to continue to proceed on a
case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court, if it should hear the issue,
and the remaining United States Courts of Appeals should follow the
Seventh Circuit's lead and adopt a; modified version of the
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. These courts should apply a
dollar-for-dollar credit to a non-settling party's liability. Applying
this pro tanto rule will further the goals of judicial economy in the
complicated litigation scenarios common in the CERCLA context.
Adding the requirement that parties to the contribution suit share the
orphan shares proportionate to their responsibility also furthers
fairness and prevents the entire risk of shortfall from resting on any
individual party. The courts hearing future suits should adopt the
Seventh Circuit's approach and strengthen it by fully explaining the
policies that are being promoted.
CONCLUSION
The Akzo court fashioned a workable and fair solution to the
problem of determining a non-settling party's liability in a CERCLA
contribution action when the claimant has entered a settlement
agreement with other responsible parties prior to filing suit.
Although the court's decision is a good one, the court missed the
opportunity to strengthen the impact of this holding by failing to
explain adequately its reasoning. The court's use of the pro tanto
credit rule, outlined in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, will increase judicial economy because the courts will not be
burdened with the awesome task of determining the proportionate
share of the response costs for every responsible party before it can
rule on the defendant's contribution liability. This method will also
further CERCLA's goal of encouraging responsible parties to settle
their liability with the government, because parties will be
guaranteed complete recovery. The .court's decision to divide the
orphan shares proportionately is also in line with the "polluter pays"
theory, and it does not unduly burden any of the parties to the suit.
Because CERCLA actions often involve long, complicated
litigation, the need for a predictable application of Section 113 is
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. A claimant's
recovery shall be reduced by the amount recovered in settlement or future
litigation, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and the non-settling party's liability
shall be based on its proportionate share of the remaining claim. Nothing
in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action
for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this
title or section 9607 of this title.
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great. The Akzo decision does not provide certainty in the law
because it was rendered at the appellate court level. Unless the
Supreme Court chooses to rule on the issue in the future, only
lawyers can generate certainty in the law. A legislative adoption of
the Akzo decision would,put an end to the confusion caused by the
current wording of Section 113(f)(1). Express legislation would
allow responsible parties the opportunity to accurately weigh the
choices of settlement and litigation before they find themselves in
embroiled in a court battle that will most likely take years to resolve.
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